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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,    ) 
      ) 
 Plaintiff-Respondent,  ) NO. 43488 
      ) 
v.      ) ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2015-5438 
      ) 
ALEXANDER STEVEN MELENDEZ, )  
      ) APPELLANT’S BRIEF 
 Defendant-Appellant.  ) 
________________________________) 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Alexander Steven Melendez pled guilty to one count of injury to a child and was 
sentenced to a unified term of eight years, with one year fixed.  The district court 
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence on Mr. Melendez in light of the 
nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public 
interest. 
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 While under the influence of alcohol, Mr. Melendez contacted a fifteen-year-old 
relative (his step-niece) through Snapchat (a messaging application), and exchanged 
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explicit photos and text messages with her.1  (Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”), 
pp.2-4.)  The exchange continued for approximately one hour, and Mr. Melendez told 
the victim that she was “really cute” and expressed interest when the victim asked if 
“maybe we could make [three-way sex] happen.”  (PSI, pp.3, 78.)  The victim’s mother 
saw the text messages and contacted the police.  (PSI, pp.2, 77.)    
 Mr. Melendez was charged with one count of sexual abuse of a child under the 
age of sixteen years.  (R., pp.5-6.)  He waived a preliminary hearing and was bound 
over to the district court.  (R., p.20.)  The State filed an Information charging 
Mr. Melendez with this crime.  (R., pp.21-22.)  The State then filed an amended 
Information charging Mr. Melendez with one count of felony injury to a child.  (R., pp.27-
28.)  Mr. Melendez pled guilty to this offense.  (R., pp.26, 29-36.)  The district court 
sentenced Mr. Melendez to a unified term of eight years, with one year fixed.  (R., p.42.)  
The court suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Melendez on probation for a period 
of eight years.  (R., p.42.)  The judgment of conviction and order of probation was 




                                            
1 This is a practice commonly referred to as “sexting.”  See Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 
139, 143 (3d Cir. 2010) (describing “sexting” as “the practice of sending or posting 
sexually suggestive text messages and images, including nude or semi-nude 
photographs, via cellular telephones or over the Internet”).  
2 After filing his notice of appeal, Mr. Melendez filed a motion for reconsideration of 
sentence pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35.  (R., p.57.)  The district court denied 
Mr. Melendez’s motion, noting, inter alia, that he did not provide any additional evidence 
or information supporting his motion.  (R., pp.58-59.)  Mr. Melendez does not challenge 
this decision on appeal in light of State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed upon Mr. Melendez a unified 
sentence of eight years, with one year fixed, in light of the nature of the offense, the 




The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Upon Mr. Melendez A Unified 
Sentence Of Eight Years, With One Year Fixed, In Light Of The Nature Of The Offense, 
The Character Of The Offender, And The Protection Of The Public Interest 
 
Mr. Melendez asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of 
eight years, with one year fixed, is excessive.  Where, as here, the sentence imposed 
by the district court is within statutory limits, “the appellant bears the burden of 
demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.”  State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834 
(2011) (quoting State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875 (2011)).  “When a trial court 
exercises its discretion in sentencing, ‘the most fundamental requirement is 
reasonableness.’”  Id. (quoting State v. Hooper, 119 Idaho 606, 608 (1991)).  “A 
sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of 
protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, 
rehabilitation or retribution.”  Id. (citation omitted).  “When reviewing the reasonableness 
of a sentence this Court will make an independent examination of the record, ‘having 
regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender and the protection of 
the public interest.’”  Id. (quoting State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982)). 
 
1. The Nature Of The Offense 
In determining whether the district court’s sentence was reasonable, the first 
factor for this Court to independently examine is the nature of the offense.  See Miller, 
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151 Idaho at 834.  Mr. Melendez recognizes that his communications with the victim 
were “inappropriate, illicit and foolish.”  (PSI, p.4.)  Indeed, they were.  However, the 
offense was not as serious as it could have been, and did not warrant the sentence 
imposed. 
Most importantly, the conversation between Mr. Melendez and the victim was 
consensual and mutual.  The following exchange took place after the victim sent an 
explicit photograph to Mr. Melendez: 
[Victim]:  Yeah you like girl on girl action? 
 
[Mr. Melendez]: gah [sic] and that ass of yours is the 
best thing I’ve seen in awhile!  but of 
course!  girl in girl [sic] on guy preferably 
[emoji] 
 
[Victim]: Hehe maybe we could make that 
happen [emojis] 
 
[Mr. Melendez]: haha yeah I wish!  lol  
 
[Victim]:  Right ugh!  stupid age [emoji] 
 
[Mr. Melendez]: could we ever keep it secret?  idk 
 
[Victim]: I’d be willing too I mean damn I still think 
your sexy as hell [emojis] 
 
(PSI, p.78.)  Mr. Melendez did not threaten the victim in any way and his actions were in 
fact encouraged by the victim.  The district court should have considered the victim’s 
active participation in determining the appropriate sentence.  See State v. Nice, 103 
Idaho 89, 91 (1982) (reducing the defendant’s sentence for lewd conduct, in part, based 
on “the circumstances surrounding the case,” which included the fourteen-year-old 
victim’s active pursuit of the defendant and, ultimately, removal of her clothing and 
statement to the defendant that she wanted to have sex); see also I.C. § 19-2521(2)(e) 
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(identifying as a ground that shall be accorded weight at sentencing, “[t]he victim of the 
defendant’s criminal conduct induced or facilitated the commission of the crime”).   
The offense was not as serious as it could have been because Mr. Melendez did 
not pose any threat to the victim.  There was never any physical contact between 
Mr. Melendez and the victim, and their conversation took place remotely, over cell 
phones.  (PSI, p.73.)  There were also no nude photographs exchanged—the victim 
only sent pictures of herself in her bra and underwear.  (PSI, p.73.)  And Mr. Melendez 
contacted the victim while under the influence of alcohol.  While these circumstances do 
not excuse Mr. Melendez’s conduct, they are certainly factors that the district court 
should have, and did not, consider.  See, e.g., Nice, 103 Idaho at 91 (1982) (reducing 
the defendant’s sentence for lewd conduct, in part, because “the trial court did not give 
proper consideration [to] the defendant’s alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing 
defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for treating the problem”). 
   
2. The Character Of The Offender 
In determining whether the district court’s sentence was reasonable, the second 
factor for this Court to independently examine is the character of the offender.  See 
Miller, 151 Idaho at 834.  Mr. Melendez’s character does not warrant the sentence 
imposed. 
Mr. Melendez is a high-school graduate who completed one semester of college 
and was employed at the time of his arrest.  (PSI, pp.10-12, 56.)  He comes from a 
supportive and loving family and has a “very strong bond” with his mother.  (PSI, pp.8, 
42.)  Numerous family members, friends, and colleagues wrote letters to the district 
court to attest to Mr. Melendez’s good character.  (PSI, pp.40-51.)  This was 
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Mr. Melendez’s first felony conviction, and his only offense relating in any way to sexual 
conduct.  (PSI, pp.4-6, 17.)  These factors weigh in favor of a lesser sentence.  See 
Nice, 103 Idaho at 91 (reducing the defendant’s sentence for lewd conduct, in part, 
because the present conviction “was the defendant’s first felony with no prior history of 
any sexual violations”); State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982) (reducing the 
defendant’s sentence for armed robbery, in part, because “[t]he overwhelming 
impression from this record is that except for this particular incident the defendant’s 
character was good”). 
 
3. The Protection Of The Public Interest 
The third factor for this Court to independently examine is the protection of the 
public interest.  See Miller, 151 Idaho at 834.  Mr. Melendez cooperated with the 
presentence investigation and participated in a psychosexual evaluation.  (PSI, p.83.)  
The latter evaluation revealed that Mr. Melendez presents only a moderate risk to 
reoffend, and that any future offense is likely to be opportunistic rather than predatory.  
(PSI, pp.115-16.)  Mr. Melendez was determined to be moderately amendable to 
treatment, which treatment would likely reduce the possibility of his reoffending.  (PSI, 
p.119.)    
The district court did not discuss any of these mitigating factors at sentencing, 
and imposed a sentence that was not reasonable.  The district court seemed to be 
concerned principally with Mr. Melendez’s statement that Internet access is a “basic 
human right” and was also concerned that Mr. Melendez did not appear to understand 
the—unspecified—harm he had caused to the victim.  (Tr. p.26, Ls.7-11; p.27, Ls.5-10; 
p.31, Ls.8-15.)  While it was not improper for the court to consider these factors, it 
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abused its discretion in imposing a unified sentence of eight years, with one year fixed, 
in light of the nature of the offense, the character of the offender and the protection of 
the public interest. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Melendez respectfully requests that the Court reduce his sentence as it 
deems appropriate.  Alternatively, he requests that this case be remanded to the district 
court for a new sentencing hearing. 
 DATED this 9th day of December, 2015. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      ANDREA W. REYNOLDS 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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